The purpose of the Act and the legislative history show that an organization was “like” the Pinkerton Detective Agency only when it offered mercenaries, quasi-military forces as strikebreakers and armed guards. It had the side effect of discouraging any other organization from offering such services, so it was not characterized as a “similar organization”. Legislative history supports this and no other measure. In the 1980s, one of the foreign policy measures of the Reagan administration was to overthrow the left-wing Sandinista government by arming the guerrillas, the so-called Contras. Between 1982 and 1984, Congress passed the three Boland Amendments, which limited the amount of U.S. aid to the Contra rebels. In the late 1970s, the popularity of magazines such as Soldier of Fortune, which glorified the mercenary subculture, led to the opening of many camps in the United States that would train men to become mercenaries and also serve as guerrillas in the event of a Soviet conquest of the United States. [102] The vast majority of men trained in these camps were white men who viewed paramilitary training as a “reversal of the last twenty years of American history and the reconquest of all the symbolic territory that was lost,” since the opportunity to become mercenaries gave them “the fantastic opportunity to escape their present lives. to be reborn as a warrior and recreate the world.” [103] In 1998, South Africa passed the Foreign Military Assistance Act, which prohibited citizens and residents from engaging in foreign wars except humanitarian operations, unless approved by a government committee.

In 2005, the law was revised by the government because South African citizens were working as security forces in Iraq during the US occupation of Iraq and the consequences of the mercenary sponsorship case against Mark Thatcher on “possible funding and logistical support in connection with an alleged coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea” organized by Simon Mann. [10] The situation during the Iraq war and the continued occupation of Iraq following the transfer of power to the UN-sanctioned Iraqi government show how difficult it is to define a mercenary soldier. While the United States ruled Iraq, no American citizen working as an armed security guard could be classified as a mercenary because he was a “citizen of a party to the conflict” (APGC77 Article 47.d). With the transfer of power to the Iraqi government, if coalition forces are not considered parties to the conflict in Iraq, but their soldiers “are sent on official service as members of its armed forces by a state that is not a party to the conflict” (APGC77 art. 47.f), unless U.S. citizens working as armed guards are legally certified as residents of Iraq, i.e. “inhabitants of territory controlled by a party to the conflict” (APGC77 Art 47.d), and they are involved in an exchange of fire in the ongoing conflict, they are mercenary soldiers. However, those who recognize the United States and other coalition forces as parties to the conflict may insist that American armed guards cannot be called mercenaries (APGC77 Art 47.d). Around the same time, Niccolò Machiavelli, in his book of political advice The Prince, opposed the use of mercenary armies. His reasoning was that since the only motivation of mercenaries is their salary, they will not be inclined to take the kind of risks that can turn the tide of a battle, but they can cost them their lives.

He also noted that a mercenary who failed was obviously not good, but a successful mercenary could be even more dangerous. He astutely pointed out that a successful mercenary army no longer needs its employer if it is militarily more powerful than its supposed superior. This explains the frequent and violent betrayal that characterized the relations between mercenaries and clients in Italy, since neither side trusted the other. He believed that citizens with a real connection to their homeland would be more motivated to defend it and thus make much better soldiers. All criteria (a-f) must be met in accordance with the Geneva Convention for a combatant to qualify as a mercenary. When PMC employees engage in proactive combat, the press calls them “mercenaries” and PMCs “mercenary companies.” In the 1990s, the media identified four mercenary companies: mercenaries fought for the Biafrans during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) in the Fourth Commando Brigade under Rolf Steiner. [129] Other mercenaries flew planes for the Biafrans. In October 1967, for example, a Royal Air Burundi DC-4M Argonaut, flown by mercenary Heinrich Wartski, also known as Henry Wharton, landed in Cameroon with military equipment for Biafra. [130] Private paramilitary forces are functional mercenary armies, although they may serve as security forces or military advisers; However, national governments reserve the right to control the number, type and armament of these private armies, arguing that unless they are proactively used in frontline combat, they are not mercenaries. However, PMC “civilian contractors” have a bad reputation among professional government soldiers[15] and officers – the US military command[15] questioned their conduct in the war zone.

In September 2005, Brigadier General Karl Horst, deputy commander of the Third Infantry Division in charge of security in Baghdad after the 2003 invasion, said of DynCorp and other PMCs in Iraq: “These guys are at large in this country doing stupid things. There`s no authority over them, so you can`t go after them when they let the violence escalate. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the consequences. It happens everywhere. [15] Regarding the use of U.S. PMCs in Colombia, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Myles Frechette said, “Congress and the American people do not want soldiers killed abroad. So it makes sense that entrepreneurs who want to risk their lives get the job.

[16] The mercenaries fell out of favor and were replaced by the professional soldier. To strengthen the army, major European powers such as France, Great Britain, the Dutch Republic and Spain commanded regiments from Switzerland, the southern Netherlands (now Belgium) and several small German states. About a third of the infantry regiments of the French Royal Army before the French Revolution were recruited outside France. The largest group consisted of the twelve Swiss regiments (including the Swiss Guard). Other units were German and an Irish brigade (the “Wild Geese”) was originally made up of Irish volunteers. By 1789, difficulties in finding genuine Irish recruits had led Germans and other foreigners to form the bulk of the base. However, the officers continued to come from long-established French-Irish families. Under the reign of Louis XV. There was also a Scottish regiment (Garde écossaise), a Swedish regiment (Royal-Suédois), an Italian (Royal Italian) and a Walloon regiment (Horion-Liegeois) recruited outside the borders of the France.

Foreign infantry regiments numbered about 20,000 men in 1733, increased to 48,000 men by the time of the Seven Years` War and were later reduced in number. [ref. needed] Because of the legal issues raised by the Boland Amendments, the Reagan administration turned to self-proclaimed mercenaries to arm and train the Contra guerrillas. [104] In 1984, the CIA formed the Civilian Military Assistance (CMA) group to help the Contras. The CMA was led by an Alabama white supremacist named Tom Posey, who, like every other CMA member, graduated from mercenary training camps. [104] John Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to Honduras, obtained permission for the CMA to operate from Honduran territory. [104] However, the operation collapsed later in 1984 when Nicaraguans shot down a CMA plane carrying weapons to the Contras, killing two Americans. [105] Sam Hall, a self-proclaimed mercenary hero and “anti-terrorist” who joined the CMA, entered Nicaragua to carry out sabotage operations. [106] In 1986, Hall was captured by the Sandinistas, who held him for four months before releasing him on the grounds that he was not a mercenary, but a mercenary.

[106] John K. Singlaub, who worked with Hall, described him as suffering from a “Walter Mitty-type complex.” [106] In England, at the time of the Norman conquest, the Flemish (natives of Flanders) formed an essential mercenary element in William the Conqueror`s forces, many of whom remained in England as settlers among the Normans. Contingents of Flemish mercenaries formed significant forces in England throughout the Norman dynasties and the early Plantagenets (11th and 12th centuries). A striking example of this is the Flemish who fought in the English Civil Wars, known as Anarchy or the nineteen-year winter (1135 to 1154 AD), under the command of William of Ypres, who was King Stephen`s first lieutenant from 1139 to 1154 and was created Earl of Kent by Stephen. [ref. needed] The Additional Protocol of 1977 (APGC77) is a protocol of 1977 amending the Geneva Conventions. Article 47 of the Protocol contained the most widely used international definition of mercenaries, although it was not supported by some countries, including the United States. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977 states: Several mercenary groups, called popular committees, composed of Yemeni tribes loyal to various factions, were formed by both the Hadi government and the Supreme Political Council of the Houthis during the Yemeni civil war.